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Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence 
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate 
criminal sanctions on certain behavior.  Much less do they 
spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, 
because foreign nations decriminalize conduct.1 
 
Louis Henkin has observed that the international human 
rights movement has always been understood by the Unites States 
as a means for protecting human rights in countries other than the 
United States.2  This conception may contribute to the reluctance 
of U.S. courts to embrace the standards of international human 
rights law.  However, the configuration of legal and political 
considerations that underlie this reluctance is far more complex.  
This Article examines this reluctance and its foundations in the 
context of a particular issue—whether individuals have a right to 
engage in same-sex sexual conduct. 
 
       †  Director of the Center for International Law and Policy at the New 
England School of Law. 
 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 74 (1990). 
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I. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a 
Texas statute that criminalized same-sex sexual conduct.3  The two 
petitioners in Lawrence, both male, had been arrested and 
convicted under this statute for engaging in a private, consensual 
sexual act.4  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, held that the 
petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives 
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention 
of the government.”5  In striking down this statute the Court 
overruled its prior holding in Bowers v. Hardwick6 that same-sex 
sexual conduct was not encompassed by this liberty.7 
In the course of the opinion, Justice Kennedy referred twice to 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)8 and 
made reference generally to the national practice of foreign 
countries concerning “the right of homosexual adults to engage in 
intimate, consensual conduct.”9  Reference to the ECHR judgments 
could have been employed for a number of different purposes.  
The Court could have turned to the jurisprudence of the ECHR to 
seek guidance in interpreting the international obligations of the 
United States.10  It could also have referred to these cases in the 
 
 3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. 
 4. Id. at 563. 
 5. Id. at 578. 
 6. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 7. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 8. Id. at 573, 576.  The ECHR was created by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as 
amended by Protocol 11, Europ. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter European Convention 
on Human Rights]. 
 9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.  “Other nations, too, have taken action 
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to 
engage in intimate, consensual conduct.  The right the petitioners seek in this case 
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.  
There has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in 
circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 10. While the United States are not a party to the European Convention on 
Human Rights, they are a party to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which closely parallels the European Convention.  The provisions 
in each treaty setting forth right to privacy in particular are very similar.  Compare 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 177 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence . . . .”), with European 
Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 8(1) (“Everyone has the right to 
2
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context of a comparative law analysis for the purpose of 
interpreting analogous rights protected under U.S. constitutional 
law, such as the right to privacy or equal protection of the law.  
Instead, the Court referred to the ECHR’s jurisprudence in the 
most timid, innocuous way—merely for the proposition that to the 
extent the Bowers Court relied on values shared with a wider 
civilization, “it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in 
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.”11 
Notwithstanding the mildness with which the Court invoked 
the practice of the European court, Justice Scalia responded in his 
dissent with the strong rebuke appearing at the outset of this 
article: “Constitutional entitlements do not spring into existence 
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal 
sanctions on certain behavior.  Much less do they spring into 
existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign nations 
decriminalize conduct.”12  He opined that the Bowers Court had 
“never relied on ‘values we share with a wider civilization,’” and that 
the Court’s discussion of these “foreign views” was “therefore 
meaningless dicta.”13  And not only meaningless, but “[d]angerous 
dicta . . . since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, 
fads, or fashions on Americans.’”14 
It seems that Justice Scalia was correct, at least regarding the 
assertion that the Court’s references were made obiter.  But was 
there an alternative?  Could the Court have invoked international 
legal standards in a robust manner?  One can only imagine how 
much more blistering a rebuke it would have received if the 
majority had acknowledged the legal force of norms generated 
beyond the four corners of the U.S. Constitution. 
The following sections will examine whether there is any 
international obligation binding on the United States that would 
have been relevant to this case, and whether that international 
norm could have been applied by the Court. 
 
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”). 
 11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.  “To the extent Bowers [v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986)] relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it should be noted 
that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere.  The 
European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom[, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981)].” Id. 
 12. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in denial of certiorari)). 
3
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION FROM DISCRIMINATION ON 
THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
A. Context 
Until very recently, no legal protection on the basis of sexual 
orientation could be found at the international level.  Although the 
horrors of World War II gave rise to significant advances in the 
protection of individuals under international law, such protection 
did not extend to homosexuals.  Notwithstanding the mass 
execution of homosexuals during World War II, there is virtually 
no mention of this victim group in the judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.15  Nor did this group 
find protection in the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, an instrument drafted 
on the heels of World War II and designed to protect groups from 
discriminatory annihilation.16  The continuing lack of protection 
for homosexuals as a group likely flowed, at least in part, from the 
belief that homosexuality is not intrinsic or fundamental to one’s 
identity, but that it is simply a matter of aberrant behavior which 
could be justifiably repressed. 
While international criminal law evolved little during the Cold 
War, it gained renewed vigor following the establishment of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and Rwanda (ICTR) in the mid-1990s.  Despite the great strides in 
jurisprudence these institutions made, such developments did little 
to advance the legal protection of homosexuals. The Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC), adopted in 1998, and in 
many ways reflecting the culmination of international 
developments, fails to make any reference to sexual orientation.17  
Indeed, the term “gender,” included as one of the grounds for the 
crime of persecution, is expressly defined as “the two sexes, male 
and female, within the context of society.”18  The definition 
continues, “[t]he term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning 
different from the above,” in an apparent attempt to prevent the 
 
 15. See United States v. Goering, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946) (The Nuremberg Trial). 
 16. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 17. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. 
 18. Id. art. 7, para. 3. 
4
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interpretation of gender from including sexual orientation.19  
Although the definition of persecution includes the residual phrase 
“or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible 
under international law,”20 the use of “universal” could prevent the 
ICC from interpreting this phrase to include sexual orientation 
given the lack of consensus noted above. 
Similarly, international human rights law has been slow to 
afford protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  The nondiscrimination provisions of the major 
human rights treaties make no mention of sexual orientation.  
Nevertheless, advances have been made through the jurisprudence 
of international human rights mechanisms.  The earliest 
developments were related to decriminalization of same-sex sexual 
conduct and were grounded in the right to privacy. 
In Toonen v. Australia,21 the Human Rights Committee, the 
treaty body charged with monitoring implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
found that the criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct 
constituted a violation of the complainant’s right to privacy under 
Article 17 of the Covenant.22  However, in that case, the Australian 
government also expressly sought the Committee’s guidance as to 
whether sexual orientation was a prohibited basis for 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Covenant.23  
The Committee confined itself to noting that in its view “the 
reference to ‘sex’ in [the nondiscrimination provisions of the 
Covenant] is to be taken as including sexual orientation.”24  While 
this did not form part of the Committee’s ratio decidendi in Toonen, 
its reference to and interpretation of the nondiscrimination 
provision marked a significant turning point in the protection of 
homosexual rights at the international level. 
Over time, the conceptual framework employed by human 
rights mechanisms shifted from one grounded in privacy to one 
based on nondiscrimination, which enabled the extension of this 
protection into the public sphere.  For example, in Young v. 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. art. 7, para. 1(h). 
 21. Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm. 
 22. Id. ¶¶ 8.2-9. 
 23. Id. ¶ 6.9. 
 24. Id. ¶ 8.7. 
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Australia,25 the Committee held that differentiation in awarding 
pension rights between opposite-sex and same-sex couples 
amounted to unjustifiable discrimination on the basis of the 
complainant’s sex or sexual orientation and thus constituted a 
violation of Article 26 of the Covenant.26 
Similar advances have been made among regional human 
rights mechanisms,27 particularly in Europe.28  In Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom, one of the ECHR cases cited by the Lawrence Court, the 
ECHR found that the existence of a law criminalizing same-sex 
sexual conduct violated the applicant’s right to privacy under 
Article 8 of the European Convention.29  Although the applicant 
had alleged that this statute also constituted a violation of Article 
14 of the Convention, which provides for non-discrimination in the 
enjoyment of convention rights, the court found it unnecessary to 
reach this question in light of the clear violation of Article 8.30  The 
court noted that 
[w]here a substantive Article of the Convention has been 
invoked both on its own and together with Article 14 and 
a separate breach has been found of the substantive 
Article, it is not generally necessary for the Court also to 
examine the case under Article 14, though the position is 
otherwise if a clear inequality of treatment in the 
enjoyment of the right in question is a fundamental aspect 
 
 25. Comm. No. 941/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2003), 
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (click on “Search the Database” 
and enter the document number). 
 26. Id. ¶ 10.4.  It should be noted, however, that this case was decided after 
Lawrence v. Texas. 
 27. As noted above, one of the ways in which the Supreme Court could have 
invoked the ECHR’s case law more robustly would have been to use it as guidance 
in interpreting similar international obligations binding on the United States.  See 
supra Part I.  Given the pervasive phenomenon of cross-fertilization among 
international fora, particularly among human rights fora, it is not uncommon to 
cite jurisprudence from regional fora as precedent for universal regimes.  
Regional practice is also particularly useful since the regional institutions, the 
combined membership of which comprises a large proportion of U.N. member 
states, tend to be more active, and thus have broader bases of experience within 
their spheres of competence. 
 28. Even within the European human rights system, though, the scope of 
protection from discrimination remains limited. The ECHR ultimately found that 
France’s refusal to authorize the adoption of a child by a single gay man, a 
decision “based decisively on the latter’s avowed homosexuality,” was not 
discriminatory in view of Article 14 of the Convention.  Fretté v. France, 38 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 21, ¶ 43 (2002). 
 29. 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52 (1981). 
 30. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. 
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of the case.31 
In later cases, the European Court of Human Rights shifted its 
focus to Article 14.  In L. and V. v. Austria, the applicants alleged 
“that the maintenance in force of Article 209 of the Austrian 
Criminal Code, which penalised homosexual acts of adult men with 
consenting adolescents between 14 and 18 years of age, and their 
convictions under that provision violated their right to respect for 
their private life and were discriminatory.”32  The court held that 
this law violated Article 14 of the Convention, and thus found it 
unnecessary “to rule on the question whether there had been a 
violation of Article 8 taken alone.”33 
In any event, whether grounded in the right to privacy or non-
discrimination, it was clear long before Lawrence was decided that 
international human rights law, and the ICCPR in particular, 
prohibited criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct, at least 
between consenting adults in the privacy of their home. 
B. Relevant Obligations of the United States 
The United States, having signed and ratified the ICCPR, 
became bound by its provisions when that treaty entered into force 
for the United States on June 8, 1992.34  In the Toonen case, the 
Human Rights Committee clearly established its view that the mere 
existence of domestic laws criminalizing same-sex sexual conduct 
constituted a violation of the ICCPR.35  The following year the 
 
 31. Id. ¶ 67. 
 32. L. and V. v. Austria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 55 (2003). 
 33. Id. ¶¶ 54-55.  While the nature of the applicants’ claims could provide an 
independent basis for the inversion of prioritization as between articles eight and 
fourteen, it cannot be doubted that the changing social and political climate made 
it easier for the court to switch from the framework of privacy to that of non-
discrimination. 
 34. See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATY FRAMEWORK: AN INVITATION TO 
UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION FOCUS 2005: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 9-10 
(2005). 
 35. Mr. Toonen had not been prosecuted—the mere fact that the law was in 
force constituted a violation.  See Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992, ¶ 8.2 (1994), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm (“In so far as article 
17 is concerned, it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is 
covered by the concept of ‘privacy’, and that Mr. Toonen is actually and currently 
affected by the continued existence of the Tasmanian laws.  The Committee 
considers that sections 122 (a) and (c) and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
‘interfere’ with the author’s privacy, even if these provisions have not been 
enforced for a decade.”).  
7
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Committee included among its “principal subjects of concern” in 
relation to U.S. compliance with the ICCPR, “the serious 
infringement of private life in some states which classify as a 
criminal offence sexual relations between adult consenting 
partners of the same sex carried out in private, and the 
consequences thereof for their enjoyment of other human rights 
without discrimination.”36 
While the Committee is not strictly speaking a judicial body, 
and its views are not technically binding, its interpretation of the 
Covenant is generally recognized as authoritative.37  Thus, there is 
at least a strong argument that the criminal prosecution at issue in 
the Lawrence case was incompatible with the international 
obligations of the United States under the ICCPR.38 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Lawrence made no 
reference to any international norm binding the United States.  To 
understand why, consideration must be given to the disposition of 
 
 36. This concern was stated in the context of its Concluding Observations 
rendered in response to the Initial Report of the United States detailing its 
compliance with the Covenant, submitted under Article 40 of the Covenant.  
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of 
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.50, A/50/40, ¶ 287 (1995). 
 37. While the United States have filed a declaration recognizing the Article 
41 competence of the Human Rights Committee to receive complaints from other 
States Parties, see 138 CONG. REC. 6, 8071 (1992), they have not become a party to 
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, UNITED NATIONS, supra note 34, at 13, 
and thus does not recognize the competence of the Committee to receive 
complaints from individuals alleging violations of the Covenant.   See Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302 (explaining that the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
establishes the competence of the Committee to receive communications from 
individuals claiming to be victims of violations of the Covenant).  Nonetheless, the 
United States are a party to the ICCPR, the Committee’s constitutive instrument, 
which implicitly recognizes the authority of the Committee to interpret the 
Covenant.   UNITED NATIONS, supra note 34, at 9-10.  The Committee’s authority to 
interpret the Covenant is also widely supported in the practice of the Committee 
as well as among the state parties to the ICCPR. 
 38. It could also be argued that there is an emerging norm of customary 
international law providing some protection against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  However, such an argument would be unlikely to prevail given 
the wide disparities in state practice.  The legal position of homosexuals varies 
significantly from country to country—from constitutionally entrenched freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to laws that make 
homosexual acts punishable by death.  Even among countries where all individuals 
are guaranteed a standard of humane treatment, controversies remain over 
whether homosexuals should be protected as such.  One example is the 
continuing debate in the United States over hate crimes legislation and the 
inclusion of sexual orientation as a ground for that kind of criminal charge. 
8
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the United States toward the reception of international law within 
the municipal (i.e. domestic) sphere. 
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND U.S. LAW 
International law generally does not dictate how international 
obligations are to be implemented within the domestic sphere.  In 
the absence of a specific obligation to alter some facet of a state’s 
internal legal framework,39 it is usually up to each state to 
determine how to give effect to its international obligations.  That 
being the case, there is no established international legal standard 
governing how international law is to be received in the municipal 
sphere.  As a result, there is a great variety among states in the 
degree of penetration of international law into the domestic legal 
system. 
That great variety of configurations falls along a spectrum 
from monism to dualism.  A monist state would be one that 
envisions international law as part of the domestic legal order.  In 
essence, there is but one legal system into which international law 
flows freely.  In contrast, dualist states would regard the 
international and municipal legal systems as two discreet spheres, 
such that international law cannot penetrate into the municipal 
sphere in the absence of some act of the relevant national 
authorities expressly transforming those norms into domestic law.  
In monist systems, international law is generally accorded a 
normative status hierarchically superior to that of statutory 
domestic law.40  In a dualist system, once transformed into domestic 
law, the formerly international norms would have the same status as 
other domestic laws. 
The U.S. legal system appears prima facie to be more monist 
than dualist.  The Constitution declares that treaties made under 
the authority of the United States, together with the Constitution 
and federal law, “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”41  The 
 
 39. For example, some treaties expressly require states to enact domestic 
legislation criminalizing certain conduct.  See, e.g., Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 5, Dec. 
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 40. See, e.g., GW. ch. 5, § 2, art. 94 (Neth.).  This article of Netherlands’ 
Constitution accords treaty rules a higher status than domestic legislation.  Thus, 
courts may exercise judicial review of Dutch legislation by testing it against 
Netherlands’ treaty obligations. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
9
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U.S. legal system appears equally amenable to customary 
international law.  As the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana 
case famously proclaimed, “International law is part of our law, and 
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of 
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending 
upon it are duly presented for their determination.”42  The practice 
of courts, however, has diverged significantly from this fairly monist 
conception. 
Notwithstanding the status of treaty law as “supreme Law of the 
Land,” it is rarely applied in U.S. courts.  One reason for this is that 
the courts have developed a doctrine of self-execution, whereby a 
treaty is to be regarded as “equivalent to an act of the legislature” 
only when “it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision.”43  Such a self-executing treaty would not require any 
additional legislative act to render it applicable as part of U.S. law.  
However, “when either of the parties engages to perform a 
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the 
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract 
before it can become a rule for the Court.”44 
This doctrine of self-execution has been invoked to deny 
domestic legal effect to numerous treaties, in particular those of a 
human rights or humanitarian character.45  This doctrine would 
also likely bar application of the ICCPR in U.S. courts.  When 
expressing its consent to be bound by the ICCPR, the U.S. 
government made a declaration to the effect that “the provisions of 
Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.”46 
Even when a treaty provision is not self-executing, however, 
this does not mean that it is legally irrelevant to litigation in U.S. 
courts.  According to the “Charming Betsy” rule, “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
 
 42. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 43. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 254 (1829). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(discussing how the Geneva Convention of 1949 did not give enemy combatants 
any judicially enforceable rights). 
 46. 138 CONG. REC. 6, 8071 (1992).  At the same time this declaration was 
made, the U.S. government also noted its understanding that “distinctions based 
upon race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or any other status—as those terms are used in Article 
2, paragraph 1 and Article 26—[are] permitted when such distinctions are, at 
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Id. 
10
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if any other possible construction remains.”47  While its terms limit 
the rule’s application to construction of federal statutory law, an 
argument could be made that it should apply to the interpretation 
of U.S. law as a whole, including the Constitution.48 
The status of customary international law as comprising part of 
U.S. law was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain,49 a case involving application of the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS).50  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter recalled 
that “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of 
 
 47. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1808).   
 48. The rule has traditionally been applied as a canon of statutory 
construction ascribing to Congress a presumed intent to legislate consistent with 
the international obligations of the United States.  E.g., Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. 
Supp. 2d 206, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).  This traditional formulation of the rule would 
preclude application in a case such as Lawrence for several reasons.  First, the rule 
is applied to avoid potential conflicts between international law and U.S. law.  The 
constitutional provisions relevant to the Lawrence case do not conflict with 
international law.  The fact that those constitutional provisions have not been 
interpreted as broadly as the protections provided by the ICCPR does not of itself 
create a conflict.  The legal provision in Lawrence that is in conflict with the ICCPR 
is a state statute.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003), declared 
unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  As that statute 
expressly conflicts with the ICCPR, there is no construction that would harmonize 
the two.  See supra Part I.  Second, if the rule is understood as creating a 
presumption regarding legislative intent, it would seem inapplicable to 
international obligations arising after the relevant domestic law was adopted.  One 
cannot argue that the drafters of the Constitution did not intend to fall afoul of an 
international obligation that would not arise until almost two centuries later. 
  Nonetheless, strong arguments support the application of the rule in 
cases such as Lawrence, even though this would involve a conception of the rule 
that takes it beyond these traditional parameters.  First, in order for the rule to be 
applied sensibly, it must acknowledge that the provisions of domestic law do not 
exist in isolation from each other.  Together they form a legal system generated 
and subsisting within a broader constitutional framework.  Viewed in this context, 
the rule is most naturally and most coherently applied to U.S. law as a whole.  
Thus, a more coherent understanding of the rule would hold that U.S. law should 
not be construed to violate international law if any other possible construction 
remains.  Second, there is no reason why the rule should be limited to a 
presumption regarding congressional intent.  Indeed its original formulation in 
Murray does not confine its application to the realm of intent.  Even if it remains 
confined to presumed intent, it could well be argued that this intent should apply 
prospectively to encompass later-in-time international obligations, particularly in 
light of the prospective nature of a constitutional instrument.  Thus, it may be 
presumed that the founders intended that the United States comply with its 
international obligations and that the Constitution was drafted accordingly. 
 49. 542 U.S. 692, 712-24 (2004). 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  The ATS of course may not be invoked by U.S. 
citizens.  Sosa is referred to here simply to illustrate the disposition of U.S. courts 
toward the reception of international human rights law generally. 
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the United States recognizes the law of nations,” citing, among 
other cases, The Paquete Habana.51  The Court expressly recognized 
this to be the case with respect to international norms “intended to 
protect individuals.”52  At the same time, however, the Court set a 
fairly high bar for recognizing new causes of action derived from 
international law and actionable on the basis of the ATCA’s 
jurisdictional grant, and cited numerous reasons why federal courts 
should be hesitant to do so.53  This corresponds with the general 
reluctance among U.S. courts to apply international law, as the 
courts themselves have noted.54 
The reasons for this reluctance are many and, in part, self-
perpetuating.  One reason is simply that U.S. law schools do not 
regard international law as central to legal education and, as a 
result, most American lawyers have no exposure to international 
law.55  Thus, the bar is unable to educate the judiciary on the extent 
to which international law forms part of the applicable law in any 
given case.56  And the perceived reluctance of U.S. courts to 
consider international law is logically a factor in the relegation of 
international law classes to the periphery in American legal 
education. 
Some have speculated that the increasing dualistic tendencies 
of the U.S. legal system correspond to its increasing hegemonic 
status.  The originally more monist framework of a young United 
States was developed at a time when the United States were new 
subjects of international law, a time when the norms of 
 
 51. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 52. Id. at 730.  Further, in finding customary international law to have the 
status of federal common law, the Court brought customary law within the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  See id. at 745 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“The Court’s approach places the law of nations on a federal-law footing 
unknown to the First Congress.  At the time of the ATS’s enactment, the law of 
nations, being part of general common law, was not supreme federal law that could 
displace state law.  By contrast, a judicially created federal rule based on 
international norms would be supreme federal law.”) (citation omitted). 
 53. See id. at 732-38. 
 54. Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 201 (D. Mass. 2004) (“In particular, 
American courts have often been reluctant to apply customary international law, 
in spite of binding Supreme Court precedent.”). 
55. See Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal 
Education and the WCL Experience, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 815, 824-26 (2002) 
(noting international law’s relative unimportance in contemporary legal 
education). 
 56. Indeed, the Petitioners in Lawrence made no reference to international 
law in their Supreme Court brief.  See Brief for Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 152352. 
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international law dovetailed well with the short and longer time 
interests of the fledgling republic.  However, a strong international 
legal order may be perceived to bring fewer advantages as states 
become more powerful.  That the rule of law as applied to the king 
is in the king’s interest is not readily apparent, particularly when 
the king’s election cycles are of relatively short duration. 
Another significant factor is the tendency of U.S. courts to 
conflate international law with foreign law.  For Justice Scalia, the 
distinction between these two types of law is not particularly 
meaningful in cases before U.S. courts.  In his Sosa dissent, he 
remarked,  
[w]e Americans have a method for making the laws that 
are over us.  We elect representatives to two Houses of 
Congress, each of which must enact the new law and 
present it for the approval of a President, whom we also 
elect.  For over two decades now, unelected federal judges 
have been usurping this lawmaking power by converting 
what they regard as norms of international law into 
American law . . . . 57 
For Scalia, there is no legally relevant distinction between foreign 
law and customary international law58 since neither has been 
adopted as U.S. law through the normal U.S. legislative process.59 
Nonetheless, the legal distinction between these two types of 
law is clear.  While international law binds the United States, 
foreign law does not.  While customary law is applicable as part of 
U.S. law, foreign law is not. 
That is not to say, however, that the practice of other states 
may not still be of relevance to cases being adjudicated in U.S. 
courts.  As noted above, courts may have recourse to foreign law in 
undertaking a comparative law analysis.  This type of analysis could 
 
 57. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 58. See id. (“The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the 
proposition that, for example, the American peoples’ democratic adoption of the 
death penalty could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views of 
foreigners.”) (citation omitted). 
 59. See id. (discussing the election of representatives and how the Congress 
and president create U.S. law).  This is compounded by Scalia’s perception of 
international human rights law in particular as something of a lesser species of 
international law.  “The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the 
consensus of states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a 
sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century 
invention of internationalist law professors and human-rights advocates.”  Id. at 
749-50. 
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be employed to aid in interpreting a provision in a treaty to which 
the United States are also a party, or even to interpret analogous 
provisions in domestic law. 
Reference to foreign law could also be made in the context of 
determining whether there exists a relevant norm of customary 
international law, the practice of states being one element in the 
establishment of customary norms.  In this context, what is being 
determined is a binding norm.  However, it would not be the 
foreign law that would form part of the applicable law.  It would be 
the customary norm that was evidenced in part by the practice of 
foreign states. 
As noted above, the Lawrence Court invoked the case law of the 
ECHR in modest terms.60  In so doing, it essentially reduced the 
Court’s jurisprudence to mere foreign practice—in the words of 
Justice Scalia, “meaningless dicta.”  By failing to tie that practice 
back to international obligations binding on the United States, for 
example, by invoking the ICCPR, the majority in a sense bolstered 
the legitimacy of Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
But to qualify that dicta as “meaningless” may be an 
overstatement.61  And to qualify it as “dangerous” simply begs the 
question: dangerous to whom? 
As noted in the introduction, another factor is the perception 
that the U.S. legal system is superior to the international legal 
system.  Thus, where their spheres of regulation overlap, 
international law should be ignored.  This would apply a fortiori in 
the sphere of constitutional rights.62 
 
 60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 61. The U.S. Supreme Court has evinced a willingness to refer to legal 
developments beyond American borders in a number of recent cases.  In Roper v. 
Simmons, for example, the majority referred to both foreign and international law 
in surmising that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling 
our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.” 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).  Similarly, in her dissent in that case, 
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that “this Nation’s evolving understanding of 
human dignity certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds 
with, the values prevailing in other countries,” and that “the existence of an 
international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a 
consonant and genuine American consensus.”  Id. at 1215-16 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).  While these references invoke international authority in the most 
feeble of terms, they at least indicate a renewed openness toward such authority. 
 62. It must be recalled, however, that international human rights law sets a 
minimum standard of protection; it would not require a State to eliminate or 
reduce any greater protection of individual rights that may be afforded under its 
domestic law. 
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In contrast to the world of 1948, the year when the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, many more countries today have legally 
entrenched rights comparable to those afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution.  In light of this fact and in the context of increasing 
security measures adopted by the U.S. government, it may be 
argued that there has been a relative erosion in the degree to 
which human rights protection in the United States exceeds that of 
other states.  Indeed, it may be that those within the power of the 
United States, and especially those who may not be entitled to the 
full protection of the U.S. Constitution, are now in greater need of 
international legal protection of their rights.  From the perspective 
of these individuals, greater recourse to international legal 
standards by U.S. courts would be anything but dangerous. 
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